Uit: Language in Thought and Action,
door S.I. Hayakawa.
Chapter 1 Language and Survival
What Animals Shall We Imitate?
People who think of themselves as tough-minded and realistic, among them
influential political leaders and businessmen as well as
go-getters and hustlers of smaller caliber, tend to take it for granted that
human nature is selfish and that life is a struggle in which only the fittest
may survive. According to this philosophy, the basic law by which man must live,
in spite of his surface veneer of civilization, is the law of the jungle. The
"fittest" are those who can bring to the struggle superior force, superior
cunning, and superior ruthlessness.
The wide currency of this philosophy
of the "survival of the fittest" enables people who act ruthlessly and
selfishly, whether in personal rivalries, business competition, or international
relations, to allay their consciences by telling themselves that they are only
obeying a law of nature. But a disinterested observer is entitled to ask whether
the ruthlessness of the tiger, the cunning of the' ape, and
obedience to the law of the jungle are, in their human applications,
actually evidences of human fitness to survive. If human beings are to pick up
pointers on behavior from the lower animals, are there not animals other than
beasts of prey from which we might learn lessons in survival?
We might, for example, point to the
rabbit or the deer and define fitness to survive as superior rapidity in running
away from our enemies. We might point to the earthworm or the mole and define it
as the ability to keep out of sight and out of the way. We might point to the
oyster or the housefly and define it as the ability to propagate our kind faster
than our enemies can eat us up. If we are looking to animals for models of
behavior, there is also the pig, an animal which many human beings have tried to
emulate since time immemorial. (It will be remembered that in the Odyssey Circe
gave ingenious and practical encouragement to those inc1ined this way.) In
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, we see a world
designed by those who would model human beings after the social ants.
The world, under the management of a super-brain-trust, might be made as
well-integrated, smooth, and efficient as an ant colony and, as Huxley shows,
just about as meaningless. If we simply look to animals in order to define what
we mean by "fitness to survive," there is no limit to the subhuman systems of
behavior that can be devised: we may emulate lobsters, dogs, sparrows,
parakeets, giraffes, skunks, or the parasitical worms, because they have all
obviously survived in one way or another. We are still entitled to ask, however,
if human survival does not revolve around a different kind of fitness from that
of the lower animals.
Because of the wide prevalence of the
dog-eat-dog, survival-of-the-fittest philosophy in our
world (although the H-bomb has awakened some people to the need for a change in
philosophy), it is worth while to look into the present scientific standing of
the phrase "survival of the fittest." Biologists distinguish between two kinds
of struggle for survival. First, there is the interspecific struggle, warfare
between different species of animals, as between wolves and deer, or men and
bacteria. Second, there is the intraspecific struggle, warfare among members of
a single species, as when rats fight other rats, or men fight other men. A great
deal of evidence in modem biology indicates that those species which have
developed elaborate means of intraspecific competition often unfit themselves
for interspecific competition, so that such species are either already extinct
or are threatened with extinction at any time. The peacock's tail, although
useful in sexual competition against other peacocks, is only a hindrance in
coping with the environment or competing against other species. The peacock
could therefore be wiped out overnight by a sudden change in ecological balance.
There is evidence, too, that strength and fierceness in fighting and killing
other animals, whether in interspecific or intraspecific competition, have never
been enough of themselves to guarantee the survival of a species. Many a mammoth
reptile, equipped with magnificent offensive and defensive armaments, ceased
millions of years ago to walk the earth.
If we are going to talk about human
survival, one of the first things to do, even if we grant
that men must fight to live, is to distinguish between
those qualities that are useful to men in fighting the environment and other
species (for example, floods, storms, wild animals, insects, or bacteria ) and
those qualities (such as aggressiveness) that are useful in fighting other men.
The principle that if we don't hang
together we shall all hang separately was discovered by nature long before it
was put into words by man. Cooperation within a species (and sometimes with
other species) is essential to the survival of most living creatures.
Man, moreover , is the talking animal-and any theory of human survival
that leaves this fact out of account is no more scientific than would be a
theory of beaver survival that failed to consider the interesting uses a beaver
makes of its teeth and flat tail. Let us see what talking-human
communication-means.
Toepassingen:
De neurologische onderbouwing aangaande het samenwerkende karakter van de mens staat hier
. Voorbeelden van een systematische vorm van bovenstaande beschreven soort van
anti-sociaal denken zijn gegeven in de verzameling hier
, en de specifieke versie met daarin het gebruik van de term "de menselijke
natuur" hier
. De bijbehorende sociologische beschrijving van dit "Ikke, ikke, ikke en de
rest kan stikke"-denken is te volgen vanaf hier
.
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