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Uit Language in Thought and Action,
door S.I. Hayakawa. Chapter 13 The two-valued orientation Two-valued logic The term "two-valued orientation" was originated by Alfred Korzybski, whose main concern was with the orientations that determine health or disorder in people's semantic reactions. Although he described the two-valued orientation as characteristic of a primitive or emotionally disturbed outlook, he was not attacking two-valued logic. Ordinary logic, such as we use in arithmetic, is strictly two-valued. Within the framework of ordinary arithmetic, two plus two are four. This is the "right" answer, and all other answers are "wrong." Many demonstrations in geometry are based on what is called "indirect proof" : in order to prove a statement, you take its opposite and assume it to be "true" until you find in the course of further calculation that it leads to a flat contradiction; such a contradiction proves it to be "false," whereupon the original statement is regarded as "true." This too is an application of two-valued logic. Korzybski had no quarrel with arithmetic or geometry, and neither does the present writer. Logic is a set of rules governing consistency in the use of language. When we are being "logical," our statements are consistent with each other,' they may be accurate "maps" of real "territories" or they may not, but the question whether they are or are not is outside the province of logic. Logic is language about language, not language about things or events. The fact that two quarts of marbles plus two quarts of milk do not add up to four quarts of the mixture does not affect the "truth" of the statement, "Two plus two are four," because all that this statement says is that "four" is the name of "the sum two and two." Of such a statement as "Two plus two are four," a two-valued question may be asked: "Is it true or false?" -meaning, "Is it or is it not consistent with the rest of our system? If we accept it, shall we be able to talk consistently without eventually contradicting ourselves?" As a set of rules for establishing discourse, a two-valued logic is one of the possible instruments for creating order out of linguistic chaos. It is indispensable, of course, to most of mathematics. In some areas of discourse and within some special groups of people, it is possible, so to speak, to "police" the language so that it comes to have some of the clarity and freedom from ambiguity enjoyed by mathematics. In such cases, people may agree to call certain animals "cats," certain forms of government "democracy," and a certain gas "helium." They would also have clear agreements as to what not to call "cats," "democracy," or "helium." The two-valued rule of traditional (Aristotelian) logic, "A thing is either a cat or not a cat," and the Aristotelian "law of identity," "A cat is a cat," make a great deal of sense when we understand them as devices for creating and maintaining order in one's vocabulary. They may be translated, "We must, in order to understand one another, make up our minds whether we are going to call Tabby a 'cat' or 'not a cat.' And once we have entered into an agreement as to what to call him, let's stick to it." Such agreements do not, of course, completely solve the problem of what things to call by what names, nor do they guarantee the certainty of statements 10gicaUy deduced. In other words, definitions, as stated in Chapter 10, say nothing about things, but only describe (and of ten prescribe) people's linguistic habits. Even with the strictest of agreements, therefore, as to what to call "cats" and what not to call "cats," whatever we may logically deduce about cats may turn out, on extensional examination of Tabby, Cinders, or Fluff, not to be true.
But what if Fluff has a sore throat and cannot meow? The intensional cat (the cat by definition, whatever our definition may be, "creatures that meow" or any other) IS NOT tbe extensional cat (Fluff, April 16, 2 P.M.). Each cat is different from every other cat; each cat also, like Bessie the Cow, is a process, undergoing constant change. Therefore, the only way to guarantee the "truth" of logically deduced statements and to arrive at agreements through logic alone is to talk only about cats-by-definition, and not about actual cats at all. The nice thing about cats-by-definition is that, come hell or high water, they always meow (although, to be sure, they only meow-by-definition). This principle is well understood in mathematics. The mathematical "point" (which "has position but occupies no space") and the mathematical "circle" (which is a "closed figure in which all points are equidistant from the center") exist only as definitions; actual points occupy some space, and actual circles are never exactly circular. Hence, in Einstein's words, "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality." Therefore, even in an area such as chemistry, in which tbe vocabulary is quite strictly "policed," statements logically deduced still have to be checked against extensional observation. This is another reason why the rule for extensional orientation-cat1 is not cat2-is extremely important. No matter how carefully we have defined the word "cat," and no matter how logically we have reasoned, extensional cats still have to be examined. The belief that logic will substantially reduce misunderstanding is widely and uncritically held, although, as a matter of common experience, we all know that people who pride themselves on their logic are usually, of all the people we know, the hardest to get along with. Logic can lead to agreement only when, as in mathematics or the sciences, there are pre-existing, hard-and-fast agreements as to what words stand for. But among our friends, business associates, and casual acquaintances-some of them Catholic and some Protestant, some of them no-nonsense scientists and some mystics, some sports fans and some interested in nothing but money --only the vaguest of linguistic agreements exist. In ordinary conversation, therefore, we have to learn people's vocabularies in the course of talking with them-which is what all sensible and tactful people do, without even being aware of the process. On the whole, therefore, except in mathematics and other areas where clear-cut linguistic agreements either exist or can be brought into existence, the assiduous study and practice of traditional, two-valued logic is not recommended.1 The habitual reliance on two-valued logic in everyday life quickly leads to a two-valued orientation-and we have already seen what that leads to. Korzybski was rarely concerned with the specific content of people's beliefs-whether people were religious or unreligious, liberal or conservative. He was concerned, rather, with how people held their beliefs and convictions: whether with a two-valued orientation ("I am right and everybody else is wrong") or a multi-valued orientation ("I don't know-let's see"). Korzybski saw the two-valued orientation as an internalization of the laws of Aristotelian logic, which say that:
He regarded his own system as an internalization of modern, multi-valued and infinite-valued logics. He therefore called general semantics a "non-Aristotelian system." This has led some people to believe that Korzybski was fighting Aristotle. He was not. He was simply fighting unsanity, whether individual or national. As for Aristotle, he must have been one of the sanest men of his time; but anyone whose knowledge and thinking are limited to Aristotle's can hardly behave sanely in our time. Defeating One' s Own Ends Action resulting from two-valued orientations notoriously fails to achieve its objectives. The mobs that tried to force dissenting pacifist or religious groups to kiss the flag during World War 1 did not advance the cause of national defense; they weakened it by creating burning resentments among those minorities. Southern lynch mobs did not solve the Negro problem; they simply made matters worse. What hardens "hardened criminals" is usually the way they are treated by a two-valued society and two-valued policemen. In short, the two-valued orientation increases combativeness but sharply diminishes the ability to evaluate the world accurately. When guided by it for any purpose other than fighting, we practically always achieve results opposite from those intended. Nevertheless, some orators and editorial writers employ the crude, unqualified two-valued orientation with extraordinary frequency, although allegedly in the interests of peace, prosperity, good government, and other laudable aims. Do such writers and speakers use this primitive approach because they know no better? Or are they so contemptuous of their audiences that they feel that "it don't pay to be subtle"? Another possibility is that they are sincere; like some physicians at the mention of "socialized medicine," they cannot help having two-valued reactions when certain hated subjects come into their minds. And still another explanation, less pleasant to think about but in many instances highly probable, is that the two-valued furor is a means of diverting public attention from urgent and practical issues. By making enough of an uproar about "atheism in the state university," "communists on the government payroll," or "who's to blame for the mess in South-East Asia," one can keep people from noticing what is going on in legislative lobbies "crowded," as Winston Churchill once said, "with the touts of protected industries." 1 It is interesting to note that even in mathematics, stress is laid today on the fact that two-valued logic is only one of many possible systems of logic. The logic of probability, on the basis of which insurance companies quote premiums, bookmakers quote odds, and physicists predict the behavior of neutrons, may be regarded as an infinite-valued logic. Naar Hayakawa, contents 
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